whether recessions lead to above or below average productive arrangements. The Diamond (1982) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) (DMP) model with endogenous separations has the implication that recessions cleanse the labor market as low quality matches are destroyed and only exceptionally high quality matches are created. This class of models, however, ignores the potentially offsetting sullying effect of recessions through on-the-job search. Models with on-the-job search imply that during recessions job-tojob transitions lead to worse matches, on average, because workers accept any match exceeding the quality of their currently low productive match (e.g. Barlevy 2002 ).
This paper tests these alternative views of recessions with data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) . Using the duration of a worker-firm match as a proxy for its quality this paper quantifies the cleansing and sullying effects of recessions. As guided by theory, it distinguishes between matches formed from job-to-job transitions versus previously nonemployed workers. This paper also provides consistent estimates of these effects by controlling for worker fixed-effects, which exploits the panel nature of the NLSY.
The results provide no systematic evidence for the cleansing effect. While matches ending in recessions are of shorter realized duration, around 2 months or 4.7 percent shorter, than matches ending in booms this finding is compositional. Looking specifically at matches ending with the worker becoming nonemployed, a direct test of the DMP model's cleansing effect, yields no statistically significant relationship between the realized duration of a match and business cycle conditions when it ends. Moreover, this conclusion remains true when controlling for worker fixed-effects.
Meanwhile, the results support the hypothesis that recessions tend to sully the labor market as matches starting in recessions are of shorter expected duration. Median realized duration falls by 4 months, or 10.8 percent, given a one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate when the match begins. This finding is robust to the inclusion of worker fixed-effects and is driven by the job-to-job transition channel. Restricting the sample to matches formed from job-to-job transitions reveals that the duration of these matches falls in recessions, as predicted by theory.
On net, the results suggest that average match quality is procyclical.
High unemployment rates at the start of the match are correlated with low match quality suggesting an active sullying effect of recessions. The cleansing effect is at best unable to offset the sullying effect and at worst not significant. As the conclusions hinge on controlling for worker fixed-effects these deserve further discussion. These fixed-effects likely reflect differences in labor supply. Using the number of spells per individual as a measure of labor supply provides some insight on the types of individuals driving the results. Frequent job switchers tend to be younger at the onset of each match, are less educated, and are more likely to be a minority. In line with their short spells, they begin and end matches when the unemployment rate is high. In spite of switching jobs frequently these individuals are less likely to use the job-to-job transition channel. This paper draws from and contributes to several strands of the macroeconomics and labor literature. It draws from the theoretical insights of Barlevy (2002) who extends a standard search model to allow for on-the-job search.
1 Calibration of his model to aggregate data suggests that the cumulative effect of the recessions between 1970-1983 resulted in a 1 percent decline in productivity relative to its 1970 level. This paper is complementary to his as it directly tests for the cleansing and sullying effects using micro measurements and focuses on the implications of job-to-job transitions. The notion that a good match is represented by a lengthy duration is inspired by Jovanovic (1979) . This premise constitutes the basis of Bowlus' (1995) who finds that matches starting in recessions are of shorter duration. She also uses data from the NLSY, but only through 1988. This paper also complements her work by considering both match creation and destruction, allowing for worker fixed-effects, and focusing on matches formed from jobto-job transitions, a key component of the present analysis. Related is also the work of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) who argue that accounting for match quality is important in distinguishing between competing theories of wage determination. This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the data used for the empirical analysis. Section 2 presents the procedure used to test for the cleansing and sullying effects of recessions. Section 3 presents the paper's empirical results and discusses the distinction between frequent and infrequent job switchers. Finally, section 4 concludes.
Data Description and Sample Construction
The data used in this study come from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), survey years 1979 through 2006. The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-21 years old when first interviewed in 1979. Interviews were conducted annually through 1994 and biennially thereafter.
The NLSY has important advantages over other surveys for studying match duration. Compared to addressed based surveys, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), individuals do not drop out of the sample following a change in geographical location, which may be highly correlated with job duration. During each survey participants report information for up to 5 jobs that can be linked across consecutive interviews. Thus, the NLSY's format allows for more consistent construction of duration variables when compared to surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
2 Importantly, the NLSY should capture short matches in between interview dates. Lastly, the NLSY has a much longer panel dimension in comparison to other longitudinal surveys such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which only follows individuals for 4 years. Given that median match duration in the NLSY is over 3 years it is likely that using the SIPP would result in a highly right-censored sample. Following Bowlus (1995) the sample is restricted to males from the crosssectional samples and only spells that start when the individual is at least 18 years old and all schooling is completed are considered. No restrictions are placed on hours and wages, other than restricting the sample to job reports with valid hours and wages. Spells that end prior to 1979, the first year of the survey, are dropped. Unlike Bowlus (1995) , all spells of an individual meeting the above requirements are considered, rather than restricting the sample to a single random spell per individual.
3 Hence, the sample not only covers more years but also more information per individual.
To construct the main sample of jobs and their respective durations the following procedure is used. First, job records for each individual are linked across survey years. Next, using the variables that contain the start and stop weeks for each job report, the start of the match is defined as the week when the job is first recorded. The end of the match is defined as the week when the job is last linked.
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Since separations are only considered to occur only when a job can no longer be linked to a future survey, rather than defining a separation as soon as the individual reports another job or a gap in employment, the remaining spells overlap within the individual's total employment history.
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To convert the sample into one where individuals hold only 1 job per month, spells that are encompassed by longer spells are dropped and the start dates of overlapping spells are redefined. Finally, the duration of the remaining job spells is computed using the reported (or redefined) start and stop dates. The resulting sample consists of 15,367 spells from 2,287 individuals or 6.7 spells per individual, on average. This sample excludes individuals with only 1 spell as fixedeffects cannot be estimated with such individuals. For comparison, table 1 includes summary statistics for the main sample and the excluded sample. In the main sample the average match lasts 2.7 years, which underscores the importance of using a dataset with a long panel dimension. The majority of individuals in the main sample are white and have at least a high school degree. Meanwhile, the excluded group of individuals with only 1 spell have lengthier matches, lasting on average 10 years, are more educated, and as consequence older when first observed. Importantly, relative to the main sample, the excluded set of individuals begin matches when the unemployment rate is lower. Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional distribution of spells per individual for the main sample. As can be seen from the figure the distribution is highly left skewed (skewness coefficient of 1.62 ) and disperse (standard deviation of 4.84). In terms of identifying individual fixed-effects it is important to notice that over 84 percent of individuals in the main sample have more than 2 spells, while the median number of spells is 5.
Estimation Strategy

Hazard Functions
To test for the cleansing and sullying effects of recessions two objects are defined. The cleansing effect is tested by estimating a start hazard function, λ s . This hazard is the instantaneous probability of observing a job start in period τ conditional on not starting prior to τ . Therefore, analysis time begins when the match is last observed and ends when the match starts. Cyclical differences in this hazard serve as a test for the cleansing effect. If matches ending in recessions are systematically shorter (lower quality) than in booms, then including the unemployment rate when the match ends, u T , as an explanatory variable for this hazard should result in a positive estimated coefficient. This is because a higher u T increases the hazard and thus reduces realized duration. For analogous reasons, the sullying effect of recessions is tested by defining an end hazard function, λ e . Analysis time for this hazard begins when the match is first observed and ends when the match dissolves. If matches starting in recessions are of shorter expected duration, then the coefficient on the unemployment rate when the match begins, u 0 , should be positive when estimating this hazard. Lastly, if the sullying effect operates by reducing the quality of matches formed through on-the-job search, then restricting the estimation of λ e to matches formed from job-to-job transitions should also lead to a positive estimated coefficient on u 0 . These hazards take the following forms:
Here λ s 0 (τ ) represents the baseline hazard of a job starting at time τ ; β is a coefficient vector to be estimated, and X(τ ) is a vector of individual and aggregate characteristics at time τ . These characteristics are both time constant (e.g. unemployment rate at the end of the job, race, and education) and time varying (e.g. age, labor market experience, and current unemployment rate) variables. Likewise, λ e 0 (t) represents the baseline hazard of the job ending at time t; γ is a coefficient vector to be estimated, and X(t) is a vector of individual and aggregate characteristics at time t. The vector X(t) differs from X(τ ) by including the unemployment rate at the beginning of the job rather than the unemployment rate at the end of the match.
The proportional hazard assumption implies that these functions can be broken into a baseline hazard function (which is estimated non-parametrically) and a proportional term. The coefficient vectors β and γ are estimated by maximizing a partial likelihood function.
7 Using the start hazard as an example, the contribution of the i th shortest noncensored job spell with remaining duration τ i is given by:
where R i is the set of jobs with remaining duration greater or equal to τ i . In the context of the start hazard remaining duration means time left until the job starts. Worth noting is that censored spells only enter in the denominator if they are observed through τ i . This artifact of the proportional hazards model is quite useful as it readily allows for the inclusion of censored observations in the estimation without imposing additional assumptions on the hazard function. Cox (1972) . 8 Given that the duration of some matches is right censored (i.e. individuals exit the sample before ending the match) this implies that these matches are left censored from the perspective of the job starting hazard. Put another way, there is a delayed entry problem for some observations: the onset of risk may potentially occur before the job first enters in observation. Because the fraction of censored observations in the sample is small (less than 14 percent) the results reported in the next section neglect this issue. However, the start hazard has been estimated under alternative assumptions and the main conclusions do not change. These assumptions include analyzing sepa-
Multiple Versus Single Spell Data
In general, when using panel data correlation may arise between observations from the same individual but not across individuals if unobserved heterogeneity is present. In particular, the duration of each spell within an individual's employment history may not be independent from the rest since surveys have fixed time horizons. Hence, explanatory variables capturing when spells start or end and unobserved components can be correlated. Thanks to the long length of the NLSY this should not be an issue as all individuals have several spells and the length of each spell is not determined by survey design, but rather, individual decisions. Nonetheless, solutions to this potential problem include using only the first two observed spells for each individual, as suggested by Chamberlain (1985) , or using one randomly chosen spell as suggested by Bowlus (1995) . These sampling schemes, however, make the analysis of job-to-job transitions tenuous.
Thus, in an attempt to use as much data as possible this paper uses all valid job spells for an individual. To alleviate the effect of the aforementioned biases each individual's spells are weighted by the inverse of the number of spells observed for them and individual fixed-effects are included in the estimation. The weighting scheme ensures that each individual contributes equally to the partial likelihood function, while controlling for fixed-effects alleviates biases arising from unobserved fixed heterogeneity.
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Additionally, standard errors are clustered to account for correlation across spells from the same individual. Allison (1996) finds that under conditions of moderate censoring (e.g. the majority of individuals experience at least two events) the fixed-effects estimator is nearly always better than the conventional partial likelihood estimator when applied to repeated events with unobserved heterogeneity. ends, while the variable u τ represents the time-varying current unemployment rate. In general, positive (negative) coefficients imply increases (decreases) in the hazard, and therefore, decreases (increases) in realized duration. The first column of the table shows that the final unemployment rate has a positive and statistically significant effect on the start hazard. This finding is suggestive of a cleansing effect of recessions as matches ending in recessions are of shorter realized duration. The current unemployment rate also has a positive effect, but is less significant (5 percent level). Note: u T denotes the unemployment rate at the time of separation. u τ denotes the time-varying current unemployment rate. Standard errors are corrected for correlation across spells of the same individual and appear in parentheses. Regressors not reported: cubic in experience, year fixed-effects, race, high school graduate, and college graduate. Figure 2 presents the survivor function implied by the estimates from column 1 to gauge the size of the cleansing effect. Recall that survival of a match in this context means not starting. Consequently, any point on the survivor curve is the cumulative probability that a match has at least that much time before it starts. The solid line represents the survivor function for a white, 29 year old, high school graduate, holding a job that ends when the final unemployment rate is at its sample mean and setting the current unemployment rate to its sample mean. The dashed line represents the survivor function for the same person, only now facing a less favorable final unemployment rate that is 1 standard deviation (1.46 percent) above its mean. The dotted line is the survivor function when the final unemploy-ment rate is 1 standard deviation below its mean. Median duration under typical conditions (solid line) is 43 months. Meanwhile, median duration falls to 41 months when unemployment is high (dashed line). Lastly, median duration rises to 47 months when unemployment is low (dotted line). These results suggest a non-trivial cleansing effect as median duration of exiting matches falls by 4.7 percent given a 1.5 percent increase in the final unemployment rate. Column 2 looks specifically at matches that end with the worker transiting into nonemployment.
Empirical Results
Job Starting Hazard Function
10 A testable implication of the DMP model with endogenous separations is that if recessions cleanse the labor market from inferior matches, then matches ending in nonemployment should be systematically shorter in recessions. Hence, the coefficient on u T in column 2 should be positive. The estimated coefficient on u T is positive, in line with the cleansing hypothesis, but not statistically significant.
As a prelude to the results in the following subsection, column 3 considers matches that end with the worker transiting into another job.
11 If recessions sully the labor market by reducing the quality of matches formed from job-to-job transitions, then the coefficient on u T in column 3 should be positive. The reason is that if workers are willing to accept, on average, lower quality matches through on-the-job search then, they must be exiting matches that are, on average, of low quality. The estimated coefficient on u T is positive, statistically significant, and nearly identical to the coefficient estimated in column 1. These coefficients imply that under normal conditions median realized duration of matches ending in job-to-job transitions is 46 months. Median duration falls to 43 months given a standard deviation increase in u T , while median duration rises to 49 months given a standard deviation decrease in u T . Hence, job-to-job transitions are, on average, exits from better matches. However, recessions skew them towards the lower end of the quality distribution consistent with the sullying effect. Columns 4 through 6 repeat the exercises from columns 1 through 3 with the inclusion of worker fixed-effects. Focusing on column 4, the coefficient on the final unemployment rate halves in size and becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, the estimated cleansing effect form column 1 appears to be compositional or reflecting the kinds of workers exiting matches in recessions. Columns 5 and 6 again distinguish respectively between separations to nonemployment versus another job. The estimated coefficient on u T in column 5 is of the wrong sign and statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficient on u T in column 6 is positive but not statistically significant implying the measured fall in the duration of matches ending in a job-to-job transition is not robust to the inclusion of worker fixedeffects. This finding can still be reconciled with theory since the sullying hypothesis predicts that only workers in low quality matches switch jobs in recessions. Hence, if the fixed-effects capture the selection effect of workers out of these matches then the observed relationship between recessions and match duration should vanish.
Job Ending Hazard Function
Focusing next on the estimated end hazard function, table 3 presents the results from estimating λ e . The variable u 0 represents the unemployment rate when the match begins, while the variable u t represents the current unemployment rate. Column 1 shows that the initial unemployment rate, u 0 , has a positive and statistically significant effect on the end hazard rate. In other words, matches starting in recessions are of shorter expected duration as suggested by the sullying effect of recessions. Using a smaller sample and narrower time frame, Bowlus (1995) estimates a coefficient on the initial unemployment rate of 0.0497, which is statistically no different than the coefficient of 0.0535 estimated in this paper. Note: u 0 denotes the unemployment rate when the match begins. u t denotes the time-varying current unemployment rate. Standard errors are corrected for correlation across spells of the same individual and appear in parentheses. Regressors not reported: cubic in experience, year fixed-effects, race, high school graduate, and college graduate.
To illustrate the magnitude of the estimated sullying effect, figure 3 presents the survivor functions implied by column 1. The solid line represents the survivor function for a white, 29 year old, high school graduate, holding a job that starts when the initial unemployment rate is at its sample mean and setting the current unemployment rate to its sample mean. The dashed line represents the survivor function for the same person facing an initial unemployment rate 1 standard deviation (1.47 percent) above its mean, while the dotted line is the survivor function when the initial unemployment rate is 1 standard deviation below its mean. Focusing on medians again, the solid line implies median expected duration of 37 months for starting matches. Median expected duration falls to 33 months for a standard deviation increase in the initial unemployment rate, and rises to 42 months for a standard deviation decrease in the initial unemployment rate. These estimates imply a sullying effect nearly twice as large as the baseline cleansing effect from column 1 in table 2. While a 1.5 percentage point increase in u T results in a 4.7 percent decrease in realized duration, an equivalent increase in u 0 results in a 10.8 percent decrease in expected duration. On net, the sullying effect dominates. Mirroring the analysis from the previous section, columns 2 and 3 consider separately matches formed with previously nonemployed workers versus those switching between jobs. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on u 0 in column 2 suggests that, in general, even matches formed with previously nonemployed workers are of lower quality in recessions. Column 2 implies median duration under typical conditions is 38 months, but falls to 36 months given a standard deviation increase in u 0 .
The positive and significant coefficient on u 0 in column 3 confirms that the sullying effect stifles the creation of better matches formed through job-to-job transitions. Median expected duration implied by column 3 is 40 months, or 3 months higher than implied by column 1 which considers all spells. Hence, on average, job-to-job transitions lead to better matches. Median expected duration falls to 35 months for a standard deviation increase in u 0 . Importantly, this implies that the sullying effect is stronger for matches starting from a job-to-job transition than overall: a 1.5 percentage point increase in u 0 yields a 12.5 percent decrease in median duration conditional on starting from job-to-job transition versus a 10.8 percent decrease unconditionally.
Columns 4 through 6 confirm that the estimated sullying effects are robust to controlling for worker composition. The estimated coefficient on u 0 of 0.0542 in column 4 is nearly identical to the baseline estimate of 0.0535 from column 1. The estimates from column 4 imply that median duration falls to 33 months given a standard deviation increase in u 0 . Meanwhile, the coefficient on u 0 when restricting the sample to matches starting with a previously nonemployed worker (column 5) is negative and statistically insignificant. This is not surprising as theory predicts the sullying effect operates by impeding the reallocation of continuously employed workers.
Lastly, and in line with theory, the estimated coefficient on u 0 in column 6 is positive and statistically significant. The estimates from this column imply median duration of matches starting from job-to-job transitions falls from 40 to 34 months. Hence, controlling for worker composition results in a slightly larger estimated sullying effect-a decline in duration of 6 versus 5 months given a standard deviation in u 0 .
In sum, the measured sullying effect of recessions appears to be larger than the baseline cleansing effect. Moreover, it is also robust to controlling for worker composition. Consistent with theory, recessions sully the labor market by reducing the quality of matches formed through job-to-job transitions, which likely require on-the-job search.
Who Are the Frequent Job Switchers?
As the results of the previous two subsections hinge on controlling for worker fixed-effects the identification of these deserves note. In the data these fixed-effects likely reflect unobserved differences in labor supply. An observable measure of this is the number of spells observed per individual. To gauge this conjecture table 4 splits the the main sample into infrequent and frequent job switchers. Frequent job switchers are defined as individuals with more than 5 spells. Table 4 suggests that frequent job switchers have characteristics associated with low labor supply and low skills. Mechanically, their spells are shorter. Importantly, however, frequent job switchers systematically start matches when the unemployment rate is higher and end them when the unemployment rate is also higher, consistent with forming low quality matches. Additionally, in between spells of employment they are more likely to be nonemployed as evinced by their lower job-to-job transition probability. Finally, these individuals are less educated and are more likely to be a minority. 
Conclusion
This paper tests for the cleansing and sullying effects of recessions using job duration as a proxy for match quality. Using panel data from the NLSY this paper finds no systematic evidence in favor of the cleansing effect, but does find evidence supporting the sullying effect. While matches ending in recessions appear to be nearly 2 months shorter than those ending in booms, this finding reflects the composition of exits in recessions. Meanwhile, recessions tend to sully the labor market as matches starting in recessions are of shorter expected duration. Median expected duration falls by 4 months, or 11 percent, given a standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate when the match begins. This finding is robust to controlling for worker composition. As predicted by theory, this finding is driven by the job-to-job transition channel: the expected duration of matches formed from job-to-job transitions declines in recessions.
The implication is that average match quality is procyclical. As in Bowlus (1995) , and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) , high unemployment rates at the start of the match are correlated with low match quality. More specifically, as in Barlevy (2002) , recessions sully the labor market by stifling the reallocation of currently employed workers to better matches through on-the-job search. At the same time, the quality of matches ending does not decline in recessions once the composition of exits is taken into account.
Given the importance of composition future research should examine who is hiring and firing in booms versus recessions. Using firm-level data, Kahn (2011) also finds that employment relationships that start in recessions are short-lived. However, once firm heterogeneity is taken into account this effect is reversed. Future research should reconcile the findings of this paper and Kahn (2011) with a matched employer-employee dataset where both worker and firm fixed-effects can be isolated.
A Appendix
A.1 Linking Employers Across Survey Years
In linking reports across survey years this paper follows the method suggested in the NLSY technical Appendix # and uses the variables defined as "Previous job number at last interview #1-5".
A.2 Hours
To identify hours worked in each job reported the variables "Hours usually worked at current/most recent job" and "Hours per week usually worked at Job # 1-5" are combined, deferring to the CPS report whenever the job coincides with the current/most recent employer.
